I would like to begin by expressing my sense of the honor done me by the invitation to deliver this Lecture, instituted in memory of a brilliant investigator of social psychiatry. Wherever psychiatrists meet to discuss the social aspects of their subject, the outstanding contributions of this school are certain to be quoted. Need I say that these contributions are embodied to a large extent in two books-Hollingshead and Redlich's Social Class and Mental Illness,L and the companion work by Jerome Myers and Bertram Roberts,2 in which the family and class dynamics in mental illness are so thoroughly explored.
In the beginning of their book, Doctor Roberts and Doctor Myers explained that the New Haven study grew out of "that body of theory and research of the past half century indicating that the social environment in which men live is related in some way, not yet fully explained, to the development of mental illness." A footnote to this passage refers us to Professor Dunham's well-known summary of the development of research in social psychiatry. In that summary likewise the emphasis is heavily, and rightly, on work done in the last half century. Since scientific progress during any period cannot be appraised without considering the state of the subject at the beginning of the period, it seemed worthwhile to devote this lecture to a cursory review of where social psychiatry had got to by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century.
The title I have chosen for the lecture suggests that the tide of social psychiatry has ebbed as well as flowed. This is open to question: some of you may think that its development is always onward:
Like the Pontic sea Whose icy current and compulsive course Ne'er feels retiring ebb; but keeps due on To the Propontic and the Hellespont.
It may be so. I doubt it, but I would not press the point, being more concerned to recall men and ideas now unjustly overlooked.
It would be strange if we found that instead of discussion and inquiry there was, fifty years ago, only indifference or denial of the social issues which are raised by mental illness. Sociology had been launched by men of the stature of Comte, Leplay and Herbert Spencer in Europe, and in this country Lester Ward, Summers and Veblen. Around the turn of the century its study was being pursued by men like Diirkheim, Weber, Simmel, Hobhouse and Cooley. Psychiatrists, on their side, had, as we shall see, been showing alert awareness of certain social problems from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards-some of them problems peculiar to mental illness, others general to medicine as a whole. It will be best, because of the range of the subject, first to take a look at the systematic expositions of psychiatry. Three of these were published approximately fifty years ago: there was the section on mental diseases in Allbutt and Rolleston's System of Medicine ;' the elaborate and comprehensive Handbuch der Psychiatrie edited by G. Aschaffenburg;' and the Traite International de Psychologie Pathologique edited by Auguste Marie.' The English System is the least informative. Beyond a few paragraphs regarding the influence of occupation and upbringing, and some expert reflections on the genesis of criminal behaviour and society's ways of dealing with it, there is very little in it to suggest that in 1900 or thereabouts the compatriots of Pritchard and Burrows were alive to the fact that the mentally ill do not each live marooned on an unpeopled island or emerge from an anarchic jungle. But the scantiness of the English survey was due to the limited vision of the editor, Savage, and the narrow horizons of his contributors rather than to the real bareness of the land.
When we come tothe Aschaffenburg Handbuch' -a much more ambitious and workmanlike undertaking-the coverage is ampler, the volume of relevant study impressive. It is most discernible in the section on etiology. The topics include occupation, cultural environment, and catastrophes, especially war; each is reviewed in detail. The author of the section on etiology, Voss' of Griefswald, had a close interest in these matters and contributed the chapter on "Einfluss der sozialen Lage auf Nerven-und Geisteskrankheiten" in Moose and Tugendreich's manual on social medicine (1913) . I should like to survey his treatment of these themes in a little detail.
First, the occupational problems of adolescence are considered-choice of job, psychopathic hesitations, the stress of disappointment when there are frequent changes of career; then the effects of unemployment, with emphasis on the psychiatric causes and significance of vagrancy or "nomadism"; here Voss recalls the classical study by Wilmanns,' published in 1906, and Bonhoeffer's' (1900) and Monkemoller's (1908) contributions to elucidation of the matter. The next occupational question to be considered is the frequency of certifiable mental illness in different occupational groups; the English statistics of 1909 are adduced, as are Austrian data on economic groups. He pays special regard to general paresis and alcoholism, taking note of the then recent studies by Marie and Martial (1908) , statistical data by Jolly (1910) and Pandy (1908) , and Hellpach's report on occupational psychoses (1906) . An occupational group thought to be especially at risk was the nursing staff of mental hospitals, investigated by F6rster; he considered them prone to develop "psychic infections." Not surprisingly in the Germany of 1910, many studies are reviewed which deal with military service and its psychiatric problems. Bennecke (1907) had looked into the apparent causes of dementia praecox in volunteers, stressing the factor of selection as more important than the pressures of the military situation. Schultze (1906), like Pactet (1908) in France, reported that the incidence of hysteria had risen steeply among soldiers in the previous decade. E. Meyer had shown that the incidence of psychiatric illness was higher in the Navy than in the Army, and other writers examined the perennial question of the high suicide rate in the German Army.
Voss then turns to a question which, as he puts it, "strongly engages the interest not only of psychiatrists but of wider circles too": viz., what influence does the general culture of a people have on mental health? He enters upon it by a survey of the evidence for and against assuming an increase in the incidence of mental illness, including neuroses. He concludes that there has been an increase and that Kraepelin9 is justified in regarding the neurotic disabilities that follow accidents and the various forms of obsessional neurosis as typical products of western civilization. He accepts Dtirkheim's10 conception of anomie in society, links it to the decline of authority, especially in religion, and sees it as a potent cause of mental illness and suicide. Voss compares incidence rates of mental disease between different peoples, pointing out that study of "racial psychiatry" was then of very recent development, and that because of the obscurity of the concept of race he would prefer the term "ethnic psychiatry" ("Volkerpsychiatrie"). Most of the recent publications which he reviews deal, it is true, with general paresis and the factors determining syphilitic infection, but there are also studies, such as that of Revesz (1911), which examine the whole question of frequency and form of mental illness among diverse peoples. Voss gives unquestioning credence to crude differences based on dissimilar methods of ascertainment, but he is cautious and judicial in weighing up the relative influence of constitutional predisposition in each ethnic group, and the climatic and other environmental conditions to which it has been exposed. He agrees with Kraepelin and other authors that there are no psychoses specific to particular peoples, but that national character puts its stamp on the manifest clinical pattern, and on the relative frequency of the different psychoses. The cultural stage a people has reached partly determines the content and form of neuroses: hysteria in particular reflects cultural development. Ideas of demoniacal possession and religious ecstasy have given way to hypochondriacal forms and complaints developing after an accident.
Voss also considers the effect of wars and other major misfortunes. Stierlin (1911) and Italian writers had reported how populations were affected by earthquakes, tidal waves, and volcanic eruptions (like the then recent one in Messina). The frequency of mental illness in contending armies had been reported, after the Russo-Japanese war, to have been only moderately higher than in peace time; from numerous Russian reports it emerged that depressive states were prominent, and that physical stresses -head-injuries, lack of sleep, infectious fevers-played at least as large a part as psychological ones. Data collected in England during the Boer War are somewhat naively supposed to show that reverses brought about a lessening of detected crime and a temporary abatement in the rising trend of mental disorder.
There is much more in this Aschaffenburg article regarding psychological stresses of social provenance, but it is sufficient to mention here the thorough exposition of induced or communicated disorder. In France, Marandon de Montyel (1906) had classified the varieties of folie-'a-deux-folie simultanee, folie communiquee, and folie imposee. In Germany, Weygandt (1905) had performed a similar service, distinguishing between "psychopathic transfer" and "psychopathic release" of symptoms. Partenheimer and other contributors to this topic were specially concerned with the question of whether someone perfectly healthy could catch a mental illness through close and constant association with an affected person (usually a person with paranoiac delusions) and most of them concluded that only those with a hereditary predisposition could succumb. These psychiatrists were, like Dr. Gruenberg in our day, led to consider psychic epidemics, especially those occurring in hysterical subjects in schools and convents, as well as the mediaeval outbreaks of tarantism, flagellation and convulsions. Such mass phenomena and the formation of eccentric sects and "crack-brained" political parties were put down to suggestion and imitation: they were aligned, in tllis respect, with panics and other signs of collective emotional upset, and the resonance of mobs to the tunes of hate, enthusiasm and fear played by psychopathic leaders received much attention as instances of the psychopathology of suggestion. It may fairly be said that in the first decade of this century more analysis of these group phenomena occurred than in the ensuling thirty years-the thirty years that preceded our curr?nt strong, and by no means detached, interest in them.
So We are still unable to compare the geographical variations in the number of admissions and discharges, cures and deaths in the different mental disorders, because of differences in the law, differences in material facilities, in the number of mental hospitals and the amount of therapeutic activity in them, as well as because of the repercussions brought about inside the mental hospitals by the swings of endemic and epidemic disease, and by social and international upheavals.
Then he collects the scattered data. Migration and industrialization make demands on adaptation which some precariously healthy people cannot meet; hence the higher rate of mental illness when a rural com-munity is invaded by factories, or a rural population moves into the city, or citizens of European countries emigrate to North America, the Argentine, or Brazil. In an interesting analysis he undertakes to show that when the figures for admission to a Paris mental hospital are analysed by occupation, those for agricultural workers are much higher than expected; when the individuals are scrutinized as to place of origin, the overwhelming majority of them come from the country and have either migrated at the beginning of their mental illness because of restlessness, desire to escape from persecutors, or need to be looked after by relatives living in Paris, or have moved to the city to better themselves and found that, uprooted, they could not keep their heads above water.
Marie tackles the irrepressible question: is mental illness on the increase in our troubled times? With praiseworthy caution he states and partly demolishes the evidence that purports to demonstrate this, but leaves the main issue unsettled. Like many before him and since, he incriminates the rapidity of social change. "The more thorough and sudden changes in social circumstances brought about under modern conditions go beyond the limits of what the average vulnerable person can adapt to."
In this he is chiefly addressing himself to the effects of western civilization upon mental health. He is, however, well aware that stresses and strains are not the prerogative of civilized communities. He is closely tied to the anthropology of his period and, very naturally, to the theories of LevyBruhl. But attractive though he finds these in unravelling the psychopathology of preliterate societies, he is always close to the observable facts and on his guard against facile inferences. Examining in turn the available data about the peoples of Asia, Africa and Polynesia, he has given full weight to the role of physical disease and drugs in producing mental illness. The statistics of mental hospital admissions, reported by diverse authorities and classified by diagnosis, lead him to conclusions not far removed from those set out today in books on cultural psychiatry. He recognizes beri-beri, pellagra, trypanosomiasis, malaria, bilharzia and other infections as epidemiological problems bearing directly on the prevention of mental disorders, but gives as much weight to opium and hashish addiction, and to animistic beliefs and magic rituals, especially among the indigenous people of Africa. His general standpoint however, is in favor of the uniformity of the types of mental illness everywhere. Thus he says, "Among the black people of Africa and the offspring of mixed black and white parentage we find all the mental and physical diseases of the white races, with variations solely attributable to the local milieu."
As one reads on in Marie's review of the literature of the subject, it becomes more and more plain that in 1910 people were asking much the same questions we ask and were as aware as we are that institutional statistics, however scrupulously classified for epidemiological purposes, could not give a safe answer to questions about causes or ethnic differences.
Qualitative differences, however, were thought to lie in the geographically limited disorders known variously as Amok and Latah, Myrischit, Malinali and Baktachi; and to be possibly discernible among offspring of marriages between people of European stock and Africans or South Americans (especially Brazilians). But Marie, resuming the evidence, concludes that these people were not, as had been maintained often, "degenerate" and more prone to breakdown.
The results of our investigations show conclusively that the defects of people of mixed blood are the outcome of the false position we put them in, and our neglect of them ... There is no doubt that their uncertain social situation affects the development of psychiatric troubles, acting both as a powerful cause and as a means of making them manifest: it is only another instance of how the environment can evoke antisocial reactions when adaptation becomes too difficult . . . Aspirations checked by a sense of inferiority and by cultural deficiences show up in their mental illnesses. The Negroes generally have low aspirations. When the struggle for existence drives them to greater efforts than they ordinarily would make, and they encounter obstacles, the direct result may be a breakdown. The mental illness they thus develop can reflect its special origins.
In the next section of Marie's System he collaborated with Bagenoff, of Moscow, in reviewing the genesis and psychopathology of collective or communicated mental disorders. Like Voss he devotes much space to the problems of psychic infection, and as might be expected of the countryman of Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon, he stresses the tendency to imitate and to respond to suggestion as a powerful factor in generating these shared disorders. The literature he adduces is extensive, and it confirms the impression that at that period psychiatrists and sociologists in many countries (especially France, Italy and Russia) were keenly alive to the obscurities, and the dangers, of collective mental illness, whether outwardly mild or severe, whether limited to two people or embracing a group or nation. Marie and his colleague, Halberstadt, had themselves made careful observations and distinguished the psychopathologically disparate forms of such disorder. On the manifest issue of how much is attributable to individual predisposition and how much to influences from the environment in these cases, Marie adduces familial and twin evidence from the time of Lasegue and Marandon de Montyel onwards supporting the role of heredity in the "communicated" and "concurrent" forms, but not in the "imposed" form. In the latter, where one "active" person dominates another, Marie shrewdly insists that the active agent can effect his control only because he expresses and stimulates morbid tendencies latent in his "passive" partner. He by no means minimizes the effect of cultural and personal environment. Illustrating his argument by cases and interpretations in the literature, especially those in which religious features are prominent, he enumerates characteristics of the environment in which such phenomena may appear: isolated localities where superstitions and fanaticism flourish; physical misery, such as famine, and fanatical austerities; illiteracy; and animistic cults. The extraordinarily widespread condition, mostly familiar under the name of Latah, is documented fully and attributed, like some other epidemic or endemic disorders of conduct, to hysterical mechanisms. Marie, however, sees no difference between collective hysteria and mass behavior: "There is a collective, or social, form of hysteria: the best examples of it are in the great religious and mystical movements." This follows from his acceptance of Cabanis' principle:
Between the normal and the morbid psychological phenomena of crowds, the differences are only of degree: the general laws governing them are the same . Bumke ,'1 whose monograph, published in 1912, on "Degeneration" as shown in nervous disorder, and its relation to culture, is a brilliant analysis of the problem, the evidence, and the permissible inductions.
I have dealt at some length with the contributions of Marie, not because he was a major figure in French psychiatry, nor because his own investigations and findings are of special importance, but rather as a telling witness to the breadth and the intensity of inquiry into social and epidemiological problems made by French psychiatrists, and indeed by European psychiatrists generally, at a time which some writers of today seem to think of as the Dark Ages.
The same range of interest is found in every comprehensive work of the period one picks up. Kraepelin, for example, in his textbook deals with the familiar social factors contributing to mental illness: isolation and restriction; wars and cataclysms; religious movements and political upheavals; welfare measures of the state; the affected person's age, sex, ethnic source, cultural status, kind of occupation or lack of occupation, upbringing, and social frustrations. Kraepelin's citation of relevant studies range widely; his review of such a matter as ethnic (Volksart) influences on mental disorder is terse, admirably critical, and still up-to-date in essentials. Besides these general themes there are a few topics that receive special attention, either because of the circumstances of the time, or because a prominent figure gave an impetus to the study.
One such timely topic was migration. The United States had recognized, as far back as 1874, that many mentally handicapped people were coming to the country from Europe. In 1891 a Federal Law was enacted excluding immigrants with mental disease and defect, and empowering the Government to see that they were returned to their country of origin. Then alarmist predictions began to be made. William A. White' said in 1903, "the offscourings of all Europe are hastening to our shores," and he added dire predictions of the deterioration this would bring about in the collective mental health of the American people. It was a time when American psychiatry was particularly rich in Cassandras. A few years later James V. May'3 and T. W. Salmon" uttered similar warnings. "When the enormous volume of the new immigration is taken into consideration," wrote Salmon, "and the vastness of the sources of population in Russia and Southeastern Europe, one can foresee the dimensions which the problem of the care of mentally diseased may reach twenty years hence." These ill-grounded prophecies, which assumed a high incidence of psychoses and defect in immigrants on evidence which did not take into account their different age-distribution from that of the native-born, were in part countered by more prudent analyses, like those of Arthur Kilbourne and George H. Kirby'" (Kirby called his paper, "A study in Race Psychopathology"). The two official surveys, by Koren'6 in 1904 and by Hill'7 in 1910 , put the matter in perspective, and not only made valid comparisons of incidence of mental illness between native-born and immigrants but paid regard to the difficulties of adjustment to life in an unfamiliar country, and the varying social factors which determine whether a mentally ill or defective person is admitted to hospital in different states. The general discussion of the problem, however, was not free of the prejudices of the time, nor uninfluenced by the political forces then brought to bear upon the issue of unlimited immigration. Dr. ,degaard'8 has reviewed the developments at this period and has recalled how immigrants deported because of mental illness often did not reach their original countries, but had to be admitted to mental hospitals near the French ports where they were dumped by the returning steamships.
It must be admitted that the accuracy of recording, the method of investigating, and the interpretation of the psychiatric phenomena in migrants at that time fell far short of what has been achieved in this field of late years; but then consider how insistent and cruel the problem has become for many in our time, and how the volume of involuntary immigration has been swollen by refugees and displaced persons. The studies published by Qdegaard, Malzberg,'9 Murphy,'2 and most recently Gillon, Duchene and Champion,' attest the complexity of the migration problem, its humanitarian aspects, and its significance in understanding the interplay between social conditions and psychiatric disturbance. The very extensive literature reviewed by the French authors in their recent Encyclopaedia articles is a reminder that the movement of population in all the continents, and between them, is responsible now (as often before on a less world-wide scale) for maladjustment, misery and illness.
Isolation has often been held accountable for some of the psychological troubles of people transplanted from their homes. Forty or fifty years ago writers (e.g. Herschmann) paid attention to linguistic isolation, which might have effects akin to those occurring in deaf people. Although migration within a country does not usually entail the risk of being cut off from speaking and being spoken to intelligibly, this barrier to communication can bring about profound and shattering upheavals in people who have moved to a strange country and, in their loneliness, are slow to learn its language. Interior migration, of course, has its problems too. In 1909 Karl Jaspers' wrote a thesis on, "Homesickness and Crime," which illuminates another aspect of isolation-that of the rural worker, simple aind perhaps stupid, who moves to the town and is overwhelmed. The exposition he offers is instructive but his ideas are not, I think, often consulted in the English-speaking countries. Isolation had its defenders, as well as its detractors. Most prominent of these was Pierre Janet.' In an elaborate review of its merits and defects he advocated isolation for neurotics, especially hysterics, because it temporarily withdrew the patient from an irritant human environment; but he emphasised that it must be only a brief withdrawal. And he adds: "We have to take into account something that is ordinarily overlooked: namely that treating a neurotic who is living with his family almost always means treating several other people too."
Fifty years ago there was also concern about the differing rates of mental disorder in parts of a single country-ecology in its rudiments. Perhaps the best example of this is the Presidential Address delivered to the Medico-Psychological Association of Great Britain and Ireland by W. R.
Dawson' in 1911:
We must study all the circumstances and conditions of life, past and present, in their relation to insanity in order to determine how far they each may have a bearing upon it. . . . I have therefore decided today to place before you certain data of more or less interest concerning the relative local prevalence in Ireland of certain social conditions such as density of population; poverty (as shown by the incidence of pauperism and by the rateable value of property, together with the number of emigrants from each district) ; disease incidence, as shown by the general death-rate and that from tuberculosis; and last but not least, the prevalence of criminality and alcoholism; the whole being considered in relation to the distribution of insanity, so far as this is indicated by the numbers from each county in the asylums and workhouses at the beginning of the present year. Unfortunately the figures showing the numbers outside institutions, which will appear in forthcoming census returns, are not yet available, but this is the less regrettable that such numbers possess, in my opinion, very doubtful value.
He quotes the 1905 Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy for England & Wales, in which maps showing comparative density of population were set alongside similar maps about the distribution of insanity and of drunkenness in the different counties. His own findings are set out in a series of histograms indicating the rank order of the 32 counties in respect of frequency of the variables I have quoted. The results ran counter to many widely held beliefs: for example, no appreciable relation was apparent between the insanity-rate on the one hand and the density of population, the death-rate, the amount of poverty or drunkenness on the other. It is to be admitted that the basis on which these rates were calculated was very weak: thus poverty was determined by considering the rateable valuation of the counties and did not correspond to the "pauperism" rate; the "insanity rate" was in terms of the number of patients resident in public mental hospitals on a given day per 1,000 of total population, although Griesinger' in the middle of the previous century had pointed out that this calculation is quite unsatisfactory as a measure of prevalence. Griesinger's remarks have a modern ring:
Of scarcely any country in the world do we possess quite trustworthy statistics. Where more exact reports are presented, they are often rendered comparatively useless, owing to their not being collected according to the same method, and especially-a great source of difference of numbers-owing to the mixing of the states which ought naturally to be separated-insanity proper, and idiocy and cretinism. Of many districts our knowledge is limited to an average calculation of the number of the insane in asylums, so Morselli. Their studies had been largely empirical, devoted to statistical fact-finding, and set in a very meagre framework of theory. Diirkheim came along with his novel concepts of social morphology and dynamic, and produced a study of deviant behavior which, as Hanan Selvin'7 has said, is still a model of sociological research sixty-one years after it first appeared: "Few, if any, later works can match the clarity and power with which Durkheim marshalled his facts to test and refine his theory." Set alongside Diirkheim's contribution, the investigations made by his contemporaries who were psychiatrists are a painful reminder that social studies of abnormal behavior require the grasp and skills of the social scientist as much as those of the psychiatrist-perhaps more so. Happy the place, and excellent the fruits, when social scientist and physician combine as they have in this University in our time.
Diirkheim was himself acutely conscious of some of the hindrances to research, whether "pure" or applied, in the social sciences. He wrote in 1904:
Thus the specialization of which sociology has need in order to become a truly positive science, is already a well established movement but one very imperfectly organized. "Amongst the more conspicuous of existing imperfections may be mentioned (1) the want of a sufficiently wide and effective recognition of the interdependence and unity of all social phenomena, as a necessary working hypothesis; (2) the tendency of the specialists to needlessly multiply entities . . . and satisfy themselves with facile explanations and naif simplicist formulas . . . and (5) the tendency of specialists to move at random without adequate conception of a definitive purpose, and hence not only to waste effort but also to leave important areas of the sociological field uncultivated.
The more amateurish excursions of psychiatrists into social investigation, or social speculation, at the time Diirkheim was writing, attest to the gulf between them and him, and their unawareness of the sophistication, in theory and method, which had been attained not only by Diirkheim but by other contemporaries also, like Simmel and Weber. This is not to say that these psychiatrists and their predecessors had been indifferent to the social problems of etiology, pathology and treatment which their branch of medicine thrust upon them, or that they were obtuse in making the broad generalizations that seemed to fit the observed phenomena. They were aware, too, that in this area of our concern there are "sturdy doubts and boisterous objections, wherewith the unhappiness of our knowledge too nearly acquainteth us." No one exemplifies this better than Henry Maudsley.'2 At the risk of bombarding you with quotations, I recall what he wrote in his Pathology of Mind in 1879: "It seemed proper to emphasise the fact that insanity is really a social phenomenon, and to insist that it cannot be investigated satisfactorily and apprehended rightly except it be studied from a social point of view." And, as an example of his interpretation of what was going on in his day:
It may be anticipated perhaps that the time will come, though it is yet afar off, when the feelings of anger and retaliation which are now roused by criminal and vicious doings will be extinct, and when those who perpetrate them will be thought so irrational as to be looked upon with the same feelings with which lunatics are looked upon now. In this relation it is instructive to take notice how complete a revolution in the feeling with regard to the insane has taken place within the last half century, with increase of knowledge of what insanity is: their irrational beliefs and turbulent deeds roused indignation formerly, and were dealt with by harsh measures of punishment, as if they were voluntary; now, however, since better knowledge of insanity has been gained, those who have to do with the insane look upon their delusions with curiosity or compassion, and are not moved to anger by their perverse and violent deeds; however much annoyed or distressed by them, they would no more think of getting angry and retaliating by punishments than they would think of punishing an unwelcome rainy day; but it is instructive also to note that the old sentiments still linger in the breasts of ignorant people.
In this, as in many other eloquent passages in his writings, Maudsley was partly expressing idees revues among enlightened late Victorians, and partly deceiving himself, as even disillusioned sceptics like him can do, about the changes occurring in the public attitudes pertaining to the recognition or the understanding of mental aberration.
But when incisive scrutiny might puncture a bubble, these sceptics could be shrewdly destructive. Consider two fashionable notions which I have referred to-that civilization as it advances brings about more mental disorder, and that degeneracy is a well-attested biological phenomenon manifested in successive generations by more and more disabling mental handicaps. To the second of these notions Maudsley unhesitatingly subscribed because he relied on clinical impressions and a misleading biological analogy, but the former fallacy he saw through because he recognized how inadequate were the statistics alleged to support it. Similarly in the preceding year (1878) Daniel Hack Tuke'9 had concluded, after a painstaking review of the evidence:
. . . that the increase of recognized insanity in this country during the last half century has been enormous; that the great mass of this is easily explained by the attention of the public and Parliament having been directed to the care and treatment of the insane; by the consequent provision of asylums; by the lower rate of mortality; and by the increased stringency of the Commissioners in regard to certifying patients.... . Lastly, looking not at the accumulation of lunatics in asylums, but at the admissions, and making every possible allowance for their considerable rise beyond that of the population, it is impossible to deny that there is reason to fear some real increase of occurring insanity.
Profitless discussions about degeneracy and the effects of social change largely usurped the place of impartial research during the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth. As Professor Rosen's'3 recent survey indicated, much acumen was shown, and much sceptical good sense brought to bear on the examination of popular beliefs concerning the price paid for advances in civilization. But the painstaking business of collecting data and making systematic inquiries was not pursued. In some crucial ways, the situation was like that now prevailing in respect of socially ill-favored deviations of personality: Whether "psychopathic" or "deviant" personality is specifically related to certain changing features in our society, whether it is on the increase, whether it can be prevented or mitigated by social measures, whether it is part of the price we pay for rapid transition resulting from new technologies, the application of scientific discovery, and great political and cultural changes-these issues seem very familiar if one has been reading the nineteenth century psychiatrists who interested themselves in the effects of the industrial revolution and what was then called progress: one has only to substitute "degeneracy" and "insanity" for "psychopathic personality," and perhaps read "social instability" instead of "progress in civilization."
Here, we are, of course, close to the problems of crime and drug addiction which attracted much attention from earlier generations of psychiatrists. The social and moral questions raised when defective or insane people commit a crime had been so sedulously conned by many of the best minds in psychiatry that it is surprising to find how repetitive the arguments were, how scanty the amassed data: they followed forensic rather than medical lines of thought, and were fortified by clinical rather than social observations. Though this is broadly true of all countries, there was in Germany fifty years ago a particularly lively interest in the marginal groups -tramps, beggars, prostitutes, juvenile delinquents -which anticipated later studies. Prominent among those who investigated these groups were Wilmanns, Bonhoeffer,3' Stelzner,8" Gruhle,' Isserlin,' and Schneider.'3 Their interest led to a search for the via media between comprelhensive statistics such as the official figures provide on a national scale, and the "Pers6nlichkeitsstatistik," as Gruhle called it, which can be based on detailed and thorough investigation of the history, psychological type and characteristics, social milieu, and interplay between milieu and disposition of the individuals on whom the statistic is based. This familiar crux, and the compromises it necessitates, was at once more troublesome and less fully recognized fifty years ago than it is by us today in the light of statistical advances and advances in the social sciences. But it is still instructive to look at the studies published by these psychiatrists of the last generation-or perhaps I should say the last generation but one; I heard the teaching of three of them, and think them now undeservedly neglected.
A social aspect of psychiatry to which these writers and their immediate contemporaries paid relatively little heed was the one concerned with the aims of treatment. A few years later, however, in the early nineteentwenties, Arthur Kronfeld' examined this question. His standpoint was the following. The difficulties inherent in adapting to economic and social conditions may in a given community or a given epoch be insuperable for a large section of the population: we then concentrate on bettering the adverse external conditions, rather than on bettering the patient's state directly. Adaptation to surroundings is not the criterion of normality and health, nor is it necessarily the aim of treatment. If we accept the thesis that the aim of medical care for mental illness is to squeeze the patient into conformity with the conditions and demands of his actual social setting, we do so only at the price of disregarding the individual and his distinctive personality. "Es wiirde eine grosse schematische Domestikation geben, ein Mensch wiirde aussehen wie der Andere." The physician, and especially the psychotherapist, is not, Kronfeld insisted, the unquestioning agent of social institutions and norms, ensuring and enforcing them. The value of a human being may be evident in his capacity to adapt to these, but his fundamental quality, which gives him dignity, does not lie in such adaptation.
Every age distills a new standard of human value out of its total economic and psychological trends, and is inclined to make it general and absolute. So our period has equated what is socially useful with what is intrinsically valuable: and increasingly we find working capacity made the criterion not only of usefulness but also of health, morality and goodness.
We have all travelled a long way since Kronfeld wrote that, and it may seem to you that we are no longer in any danger of equating a man's mental health with his capacity for adapting to his surroundings, working, and conforming. But I doubt if this issue has really been clarified; all of us who have struggled to understand what we really mean by mental health have cause to hesitate, and it is often hard to say whether we overvalue the social acceptability of behavior in judging whether the behavior is morbid, and in assessing the degree of its morbidity. Behind this, as behind the relationship between choice of treatment and social class, lie prejudices and values which are too seldom made explicit.
I have referred particularly to Kronfeld because he is an outstanding representative of a regrettably transient school of psychiatrists who were keenly alive to the social implications of mental illness, rigorous in analyzing the relationship systematically, and protected against untethered theorizing by their daily contact with raw clinical material. Kronfeld, in the chapter on "Sociology of the Mentally Abnormal" in his classical work on the Perspectives of Psychotherapy, and Karl Birnbaum7 in his many writings on "Culture and Psychopathology," furnished blueprints for the great argument which has held, and will long hold, the psychiatric stage. Dividing the problems into those which treat of how social forces contribute to mental illness on the one hand, and on the other those which trace the ways in which mental abnormality affects the well-being, the structure and development of society, these psychiatrists showed the influence of philosophers such as Husserl; of sociologists, like Weber and Diirkhie1m;
and of psychopathologists, notably Freud and Adler.
The views these men (Kronfeld, Birnbaum) expounded in the nineteentwenties were neither heterodox, nor hidden in obscure journals, nor embodied in pretentious and repellent language. They were readable and persuasive; men who had great authority, like Jaspers, subscribed to them; yet the average textbook of psychiatry in the English language, and the average practicing psychiatrist, paid them little regard. Psychiatric social workers, it is true, came to be regarded as essential members of a psychiatric staff; but often, as it emerged, their functions came to be exercised more in psychotherapy of the family than in the larger society of which the family is a nidus and microcosm.
In the thirty years since Kronfeld and Birnbaum and the rest flourished, there have been great advances in the social sciences and in their application to psychiatry, but psychiatrists, on the whole, have been dilatory in keeping up with them. It was still the case, five years ago, that Professor Hollingshead8' had to describe the position in this way:
In commenting upon the areas of acceptance (between schools of thought on causation) I would suggest the following order: first, the organic, because it is most firmly entrenched within the institution of medicine; second, the psychological, because it also is well accepted in medicine, though perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent; third, the social because it has been even less completely adopted; and finally, the dynamic, which I put at the end because I think that it would bring together and integrate the other three.
It seems strange that psychiatrists, of all people, should be slow to accept the full implications of the thesis that men live their mental lives in and through society.
Fifty years ago sociology was emerging from its grand theory stage parented by Comte and Herbert Spencer. In 1904 Diirkheim had said, in an address to the Sociological Society of London:
Most subsequent sociologists have continued the Comte-Spencer tradition of seeking to discover the general laws of social evolution by speculative rather than observational methods. And yet it is evident that the multitude of facts which are called social can only be studied in a scientific manner by disciplines equally multiple and special. It cannot suffice to survey the complex social world with general views prematurely unified, and hence confused and vague.
And a year later, addressing the same society, Hobhouse said that the ambitious attempts at a great sociological system like Comte's having failed, the dwelling-place of sociology had been swept and garnished, and "into this home have come the seven devils of sciolism. You have people prepared to dogmatize on social affairs from no knowledge at all, or from a little reflection on the popular literature of the day, or finally, you have the attempt to deal with the science of society as if it were a department of the science of biology." The fears thus expressed were understandable but excessive. It may be that for a period the swing away from grand systems and sweeping theories went too far, and that empirical fact-collecting about irrelevant or trivial issues was carried to extremes, justifying Gunnar Myrdal's comment that "more and more effort is devoted to less and less important problems." But it is hardly seemly for a psychiatrist to enter into the jousts where Professor Wright Mills is laying about him, or to offer an opinion on the present conflicts. The psychiatrist sees, nowhere better than here in New Haven, that sociologists work mainly with theories of the middle range, within a relevant, limited socio-cultural context, testing these theories by empirical research. He sees that by collaboration the questions the psychiatrist asks can be formulated so that a significant problem, amenable to investigation by sociologist and psychiatrist jointly, emerges, and that its prosecution yields illuminating results. If the psychiatrist, turning as he can here from the demonstration of what such collaboration can achieve, examines the present state of social psychiatry in general he finds some cause for disappointment at the slow rate of progress; he may also conclude that progress takes a strangely cyclical course. "For, as though there were a metempsychosis, and the soul of one man passed into another, opinions do Units and sheltered workshops (Remploy); and the favorable or adverse influences in the home and living conditions of patients with continuing schizophrenic illness. For this second approach, in which actionresearch and laboratory experiments are both required, there is everything to be said: naturally I think so, because that has for some years been one of the main activities of the Research Unit in Social Psychiatry of which I have the honor to be Director. As for the more confident policy, of which the Royal Commission were the very powerful spokesmen, there is of course immense advantage in a reformist movement which is consciously directed against the abuse of letting patients languish and moulder in a sterile, indifferent or neglectful milieu, and which makes relatively normal community life the aim and the criterion of therapeutic success of patients who will never recover. But along with the advantages go risks of detriment-not to the patients, necessarily, but to those with whom they come in contact in the community: especially their families and those with whom they work. An overzealous fulfillment of the policy of turning away from institutional to community care can bring its own abuses in its train. The philosophers thought it proper to put not one but two mottoes on the temple at Delphi: one, the better remembered, was "Know Thyself," but the second, equally imperative, enjoined "Nothing in Excess." It might be worth inscribing that over the temple of psychiatry. This, however, is a digression. I have wanted only to recall that in this area of social psychiatry, which considers schizophrenia, we are today doubling on our tracks, reverting to a broad principle enunciated and acted on fifty years ago; but we are dealing with it now in a rather different way from that of Bleuler and his contemporaries. On the one hand we are accumulating our statistics of the increasing number of patients kept in the community, and we comtemplate these with the satisfaction and fervor that attends a manifest effort towards progress; and on the other hand we investigate rather laboriously the social, clinical and psychological problems that must be solved before it is certain that the satisfaction and fervor are fully warranted. In its cyclical course psychiatry has come round to where it stood in 1910 on this matter, but today it has greatly enhanced opportunities for analyzing and resolving the problems-especially those in the family-that underlie the socio-clinical issue affecting chronic schizophrenics. I believe the same could be said of many other socioclinical issues in psychiatry.
The moral of this tale, it seems to me, is that we do ill to think lightly of our predecessors in social psychiatry. The ablest among us need not be so humble as to say, with Bernard of Chartres, that we are dwarfs sitting on the shoulders of giants; but neither need it be supposed that we are giants sitting on the shoulders of dwarfs, or sitting on nobody's shoulders at all. In fifty years there has been a great forward move, in which empirical generalizations from experience have been submitted to the chastening tests of experiment, quantification and reference to more refined theoretical concepts and systems of ideas. In the same fifty years psychiatrists, and I think sociologists too, have sometimes cultivated diverse plots in the psychiatric estate without counting the harvest reaped by the insight and the admittedly cruder methods of the men who were tilling the same areas around the turn of the century. The work of these men was not negligible. But in their day the extra-medical forces that influence the lines of psychiatric research were less consciously and powerfully directed towards social problems than in 1960. As Sigerist has said, the development of medical science is largely determined by nonmedical factors -Weltanschauung, technologic invention, philosophy, religion, economics, advances in the physical and biological sciences. In our time advances in the social sciences, too, contribute an impetus to research and social action which perhaps owes something to psychiatry and which certainly promises to enrich it.
